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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 John Michael Muguira appeals from the district court’s order denying his 
motion for credit for time served. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Muguira in Canyon County Case No. CR-2009-15664 
(hereinafter “the Canyon County case”) with possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to deliver.  (R., pp.31-32.)  Muguira pled guilty, and the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, but 
suspended the sentence and placed Muguira on probation for five years. (R., 
pp.57-67.)  Muguira subsequently admitted to having violated his probation, and 
the district court revoked his probation, executed his underlying sentence, and 
retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.68-88, 127-28, 130-40, 148-50, 157-59.)  After a 
period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the balance of 
Muguira’s sentence and reinstated him on probation for four years.  (R., pp.167-
70.) 
 On June 12, 2012, just two months after Muguira had been reinstated on 
probation, the state filed a petition for probation violation alleging Muguira had 
violated his probation by (1) being arrested for felony driving under the influence 
of alcohol (DUI) in Ada County on June 1, 2012; (2) leaving his assigned district 
without permission; and (3) being under the influence of alcohol.  (R., pp.171-
78.)  The district court signed a warrant for Muguira’s arrest for the probation 
violations, but the warrant was never served.  (R., pp.184-87.) 
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 As a result of his arrest in Ada County on June 1, 2012, Muguira was 
charged in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2012-0008187 (hereinafter “the Ada 
County case”) with felony DUI and misdemeanor driving without privileges.  
(12/4/12 Judgment Of Conviction And Order Retaining Jurisdiction, filed in Ada 
County Case No. CR-FE-2012-8187 (augmentation).)  Muguira pled guilty to the 
DUI charge, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with 
three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (Id.) 
 On May 2, 2013, while he was serving his period of retained jurisdiction in 
the Ada County case, Muguira wrote a letter to the district court in the Canyon 
County case.  (5/2/13 Letter (augmentation).)  In the letter, Muguira explained he 
had been in custody on the Ada County DUI charge since June 1, 2012.  (Id.)  
He also represented that, although the state filed a petition for probation violation 
in the Canyon County case on June 12, 2012, “the warrant was never active and 
[he] was never served with it while [he] was in custody at the Ada County jail.”  
(Id.)  Muguira made similar representations in a pro se document entitled “Motion 
And Affidavit In Support To Quash Warrant And Proceed With Disposition,” 
which was filed in the Canyon County case on May 6, 2013.  (R., pp.178-81.) 
 On October 4, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation to quash the warrant in 
the Canyon County case.  (10/4/13 Stipulation To Quash Warrant 
(augmentation).)  The stipulation provided: 
[The parties, through counsel of record,] hereby stipulate that the 
warrant in the above-entitled case be quashed and that the 
Defendant be summonsed to appear at an arraignment on the 
pending Petition for Probation Violation.  This stipulation is 
based upon the fact that the Defendant has been placed upon 
probation in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2011-0004346 and in 
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Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2012-0008187 following his 
successful completion of the Therapeutic Community Rider 
program. 
 
(Id.)  The district court accepted the stipulation and entered an order quashing 
the warrant and summonsing Muguira to appear for an arraignment on the 
pending petition for probation violation.  (R., pp.182-83; see also R., p.184 
(recalling “bench warrant issued on 6/12/2012”), pp.185-87 (notation “Quashed” 
appears on face of arrest warrant signed by district court on June 12, 2012).) 
 On October 11, 2013, Muguira appeared, out of custody, at the 
arraignment on the June 2012 petition for probation violation.  (R., p.188.)  At a 
subsequent hearing, at which he also appeared out of custody, Muguira admitted 
to having violated his probation as alleged in the June 2012 report of violation.  
(R., pp.191-92.)  The district court accepted Muguira’s admissions and reinstated 
him on probation for four years.  (R., pp.192-95.)   
 Less than a month later, the state filed another petition for probation 
violation alleging Muguira had been charged with new crimes.  (R., pp.196-218.)  
Muguira admitted to having violated his probation, and on April 23, 2014, the 
district court revoked his probation and ordered his underlying sentence 
executed.  (R., pp.234-36, 238-43.) 
 Approximately one year later, Muguira filed a pro se motion seeking credit 
toward his Canyon County sentence for the time he served from June 1, 2012 – 
the date of his arrest in the Ada County case – to October 4, 2013 – the date he 
was released from custody in the Ada County case.  (R., pp.244-58.) The district 
court denied the motion.  (R., pp.259-61.)  The court found that, although a 
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petition for probation violation was filed in the Canyon County case on June 12, 
2012, and a warrant issued on that date, there was “no evidence that [Muguira] 
was ever served with the warrant, or that he was otherwise held on a functional 
equivalent.”  (R., pp.259-60.)  The court also found there was “no evidence that 
[Muguira] was in custody in the [Canyon County] case” and that “the time he 
spent incarcerated and participating in the retained jurisdiction program” between 
June 1, 2012 and October 4, 2013, was “attributable solely to the Ada County 
case.” (R., p.260.)  Muguira timely appealed from the district court’s order 






Muguira states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Muguira’s motion for 
credit for time served? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Muguira failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion 
for credit toward his Canyon County sentence for time he served exclusively in 











 The district court denied Muguira’s motion for credit for time served, ruling 
Muguira was not entitled to credit toward his Canyon County sentence for the 
490 days he was incarcerated between June 1, 2012, and October 4, 2013, 
because that incarceration was “attributable solely to the Ada County case.”  (R., 
pp.259-60.)  Muguira challenges the district court’s ruling, contending he is 
statutorily entitled to credit toward his Canyon County sentence for the time he 
served following his arrest in Ada County because (1) the Ada County charge 
formed the basis of the probation violation allegations in the Canyon County 
case; and (2) although he was never served with it, “the arrest warrant for the 
probation violation served as the functional equivalent of a bench warrant.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-15.)  Correct application of the law to the facts of this 
case shows neither argument has merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts.”  State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)).  The construction and application of a statute 
also presents a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free 
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review.  State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 307, 142 P.3d 729, 730 (2006); State 
v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). 
 
C. Muguira Has Failed To Show Any Statutory Entitlement To Credit Toward 
His Canyon County Sentence For The Time He Served In The Ada 
County Case Before Being Held To Answer For The Probation Violation In 
The Canyon County Case 
 
Because “the best guide to legislative intent” is the words of the statute, the 
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.  State v. Doe, 147 
Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).  Where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written.  
McLean v. Maverick County Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 
(2006).  Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one 
reasonable interpretation, it is the court’s duty to give the statute that 
interpretation.  Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 
894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that 
Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was 
“palpably absurd”).      
The statutory provisions upon which Muguira bases his claim of 
entitlement to credit for time served are I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-209A.1  Contrary
                                            
1 Both I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-209A were amended, effective July 1, 2015.  See 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, §§ 2 and 3.  Because the amendments took 
effect after the district court entered its April 23, 2014 order revoking Muguira’ s 
probation and executing his sentence, all references herein to I.C. §§ 19-2603 
and 20-209A are to the versions of the statutes as they existed at the time 
Muguira’ s probation was finally revoked. 
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to Muguira’s arguments, an examination of the plain language of those statutes 
shows Muguira is not entitled to the credit he seeks.    
 
1. Muguira Is Not Entitled Under I.C. § 19-2603 To Credit Toward 
 His Canyon County Sentence For Time He Served Exclusively 
 In Relation To The Ada County Case 
 
Idaho Code § 19-2603 governs a defendant’s entitlement to credit for time 
served upon execution of the defendant’s sentence following a probation 
violation.  At all times relevant to the trial court’s ruling on Muguira’s motion for 
credit for time served, the statute provided: 
Pronouncement and execution of judgment after 
violation of probation. – When the defendant is brought before 
the court in such case, it may, if judgment has been withheld, 
pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, 
or, if judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, the 
original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be 
executed according to law, and the time such person shall have 
been at large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted 
as a part of the term of his sentence, but the time of the 
defendant’s sentence shall count from the date of service of such 
bench warrant. 
 
I.C. § 19-2603 (bolded emphasis original, italicized emphasis added).  Pursuant 
to the plain language of this statute, a defendant whose probation is revoked as 
a result of a probation violation is only entitled to credit toward his sentence for 
the time he served from the date of service of the bench warrant on the 
violation(s).  Id.; accord State v. Bitkoff, 157 Idaho 410, 413, 336 P.3d 817, 820 
(Ct. App. 2014) (“Under the plain terms of I.C. § 19-2603, a defendant is entitled 
to credit for time served from service of a bench warrant for a probation 
violation.” (footnote omitted)); State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 398, 179 P.3d 
360, 361 (Ct. App. 2008) (“credit must be given for jail incarceration after arrest 
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for a probation violation” (emphasis omitted)); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 127, 
922 P.2d 419, 424 (Ct. App. 1996) (“Section 19-2603 provides that if a 
probationer has been arrested and probation revoked as a result of a violation, 
the defendant’s incarceration from the time of service of the bench warrant will 
count as part of the sentence.” (footnote omitted)); State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 
279, 280, 954 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
In this case, it is undisputed that, after Muguira’s June 1, 2012 arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol in the Ada County case, the state filed a 
motion for probation violation in the Canyon County case.  (R., pp.171-78.)  A 
bench warrant for the probation violation issued on June 12, 2012, but Muguira 
was never served with the warrant.  (R., pp.184-87; 5/2/13 Letter 
(augmentation).)  Muguira remained incarcerated in the Ada County case and 
served a period of retained jurisdiction, after which he was released on 
probation.  (R., pp.246-52; 5/2/13 Letter (augmentation); 10/4/13 Stipulation To 
Quash Warrant (augmentation).)  Contemporaneously with his October 4, 2013 
release on probation in the Ada County case, the parties in the Canyon County 
case filed a stipulation to quash the Canyon County bench warrant, which the 
district court granted.  (R., pp.182-87; 10/4/13 Stipulation To Quash Warrant 
(augmentation); see also R, pp.246-52 (showing release from Ada County on 
10/4/13).)  Muguira was summonsed to appear for the Canyon County probation 
violation proceedings, and he thereafter appeared out of custody at two 
hearings, after which he was reinstated on probation.  (R., pp.182-88, 191-95.)  
Because the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 only allows credit for time served 
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from the date of service of the bench warrant for a probation violation, and 
because Muguira was never served with the Canyon County bench warrant while 
he was incarcerated on the Ada County charges (and, in fact, was released from 
custody upon completion of his rider in the Ada County case), the district court 
correctly concluded Muguira was not entitled to any credit toward his Canyon 
County sentence for the 490 days he served between June 1, 2012 and October 
4, 2013, because that incarceration was “attributable solely to the Ada County 
case.”  (R., p.260.) 
 Muguira argues otherwise.  Specifically, he contends that, because he 
was aware during his period of incarceration in the Ada County case that a 
warrant for probation violation had been issued in the Canyon County case, and 
because the Canyon County warrant identified Muguira’s last known address as 
the “Ada County Jail,” his “arrest and incarceration on the Ada County DUI was 
the functional equivalent of service of a bench warrant on the Canyon County 
probation violation.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-15.)  To support his position, 
Muguira relies on Buys, supra.  Muguira correctly notes that, in Buys, the Court 
of Appeals held Buys was entitled to credit for time served pursuant to an “order 
of incarceration” – entered by the district court before the issuance of any bench 
warrant on Buys’ alleged probation violations – based on its determination that 
the “order of incarceration” “appear[ed] to be the functional equivalent of a bench 
warrant issued as a consequence of an alleged violation of probation terms.”  
Buys, 129 Idaho at 127-28, 922 P.2d at 424-25.  Muguira’s reliance on the 
rationale of Buys to establish his entitlement to credit for the 490 days he served 
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in relation to the Ada County case before ever being held to answer for the 
Canyon County probation violation allegations is unavailing for at least two 
reasons. 
First, the rationale of Buys – that a defendant is entitled to credit for time 
served on orders that are the “functional equivalent” of a bench warrant – is 
inconsistent with the unambiguous language of I.C. § 19-2603 that only permits 
credit for time served from the date of service of the actual bench warrant.  
Where, as here, the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
must apply statute as written.  Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96, 265 P.3d at 508-09 
(disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect to unambiguous 
language of statute if such was “palpably absurd”).  To the extent Buys holds 
otherwise, it was wrongly decided in light of the Idaho Supreme Court’s later 
opinion in Verska and should therefore be overruled.  State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 
6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002) (controlling precedent must be followed “unless it 
is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or 
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice”).   
Second, the facts of Buys are easily distinguishable from the facts of this 
case.  Although Buys was not served with a bench warrant, he was actually 
arrested and held for violating the conditions of his probation pursuant to a pre-
warrant “order of incarceration” issued in the case in which the probation 
violation was filed.  Buys, 129 Idaho at 124, 922 P.2d at 421.  In this case, 
Muguira was never arrested or otherwise held in custody as a result of the 
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probation violation allegations filed in the Canyon County case.  Muguira was 
incarcerated on an Ada County DUI charge that gave rise to one of the Canyon 
County probation violation allegations, but he was never in custody on the 
probation violation allegations themselves, as evidenced both by the fact that the 
bench warrant was never served and by the fact that the warrant was quashed 
and Muguira was released from custody upon being placed on probation in the 
Ada County case. 
Relying on Idaho Criminal Rule 4(h)(3), Muguira argues he was 
constructively served with the Canyon County warrant while incarcerated in the 
Ada County case because he was aware the warrant had been issued and had 
“discussed the … warrant with deputies at the Ada County Jail.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.13-14.)  Muguira’s argument is without merit.  Although the state agrees 
that I.C.R. 4(h)(3) “does not require [an] officer to physically hand a copy of the 
warrant to the arrestee” (Appellant’s brief, p.13), Muguira’s claim that an officer 
executes a warrant merely by telling the defendant about the warrant and then 
showing it to him as soon as possible, without ever actually arresting the 
defendant on the warrant, is nonsensical and contrary to the plain language of 
the rule.  Rule 4(h)(3) specifically provides that a “warrant shall be executed by 
the arrest of the defendant.”  That Muguira was already incarcerated in the Ada 
County case when he found out about the Canyon County warrant and 
“discussed” it with Ada County deputies does not show he was ever arrested on 
the warrant.  The warrant was never returned and, in fact, was quashed pursuant 
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to the stipulation of the parties when Muguira was released on probation in the 
Ada County case.   
 The plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 only allows credit for time served 
from the date of service of the bench warrant for a probation violation.  Muguira 
was never served with a bench warrant in this case and was not otherwise in 
custody as a result of his probation violations.  Accordingly, Muguira is not 
entitled under the statute to credit toward his sentence for the 490 days he 
served in the Ada County Cases before being held to answer for the probation 
violation in this case. 
 
 2. Muguira Is Not Entitled Under I.C. § 20-209A To Credit Toward 
His Canyon County Sentence For Time He Served Exclusively 
In Relation To The Ada County Case 
 
 Idaho Code § 20-209A governs entitlement to credit for time served both 
before and after sentencing and, at all times relevant to the disposition of 
Muguira’s motion, provided: 
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of 
correction, his term of confinement begins from the day of his 
sentence.  A person who is sentenced may receive credit toward 
service of his sentence for time spent in physical custody pending 
trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that detention was in connection 
with the offense for which the sentence was imposed. … 
 
I.C. § 20-209A (emphasis added).  Relying both on the above italicized language 
and on the Idaho Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 
179 P.3d 361 (Ct. App. 2008), Muguira argues he is entitled to credit toward his 
Canyon County sentence for the 490 days he served in relation to the Ada 
County case because the charge in the Ada County case formed the basis of the 
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Canyon County probation violation allegations and because his sentences in the 
two cases were ordered to run concurrently.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11.)  Neither 
the plain language of I.C. § 20-209A nor the rationale of McCarthy support 
Muguira’s argument. 
 The plain language of I.C. § 20-209A contemplates that a defendant 
receive credit toward his sentence only for those periods of physical 
custody/detention that were “in connection with the offense for which the 
sentence was imposed.”  In this case, there is no question that the probation 
violation allegations in the Canyon County case stemmed at least in part from 
the Ada County DUI charge.  But, as set forth in detail in Section C.1., supra, 
Muguira was never detained on the Canyon County probation violation 
allegations; instead, his incarceration from June 1, 2012, to October 4, 2013, 
was attributable solely to his arrest and conviction in the Ada County case.  
Because Muguira was never detained “in connection with” the Canyon County 
probation violations, he is not entitled under I.C. § 20-209A to credit toward his 
Canyon County sentence for the time he served in relation to the Ada County 
case. 
 Contrary to Muguira’s assertions, McCarthy, supra, does not compel a 
different result.  McCarthy was on probation for possession of methamphetamine 
when he twice delivered methamphetamine to an undercover officer.  McCarthy, 
145 Idaho at 398, 179 P.3d at 361.  McCarthy was arrested on a bench warrant 
for a probation violation in the possession of methamphetamine case and, while 
he was incarcerated, he was also served with an arrest warrant, issued in “a 
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separate case arising from the same transactions with the undercover officer,” 
for two counts of delivery of methamphetamine.  Id.  Citing I.C. § 18-309 and its 
prior decisions that hold “a defendant is entitled to credit on all concurrent 
sentences for prejudgment incarcerations simultaneously served in a single 
county on separate crimes,” the Court of Appeals concluded “the same logic 
require[d] credit on both of McCarthy’s sentences where his incarceration on a 
probation violation in the possession case and on a new criminal charge in the 
delivery case were based upon precisely the same conduct and concurrent 
sentences [were] imposed.”  McCarthy, 145 Idaho at 398-99, 179 P.3d at 361-62 
(emphasis in original).  The Court reasoned:  “When it is the same acts that give 
rise to both warrants for the defendant’s arrest and the confinement is served 
simultaneously, it cannot be said that the incarceration is uniquely attributable to 
either case individually.”  Id. at 399, 179 P.3d at 362 (emphasis added).  
 Unlike McCarthy, who was served with arrest warrants both for the 
probation violation in the possession of methamphetamine case and for the new 
charges in the delivery case, Muguira was only arrested on the Ada County DUI 
charge and was never served with an arrest warrant for the probation violations 
in the Canyon County case.  Because Muguira was never served with the 
Canyon County warrant while in incarcerated on the Ada County charge (or at 
any point at all), Muguira was not serving simultaneous periods of confinement in 
the two cases; instead, his incarceration between June 1, 2012, and October 4, 
2013, was “uniquely attributable to” the Ada County case. 
 
 16 
 For all of the reasons set forth above, Muguira has failed to show any 
statutory entitlement to credit toward his Canyon County sentence for the 490 
days he served in Ada County before being held to answer for the probation 
violations in the Canyon County case.  Having failed to do so, Muguira has failed 
to show the district court erred in denying his motion for credit for time served.   
   
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order denying Muguira’s motion for credit for time served. 
 DATED this 5th day of April, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Lori A. Fleming_____ 
 LORI A. FLEMING 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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